## **EXHIBIT C**

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1	STATE OF MICHIGAN
2	IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF INGHAM
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	GREAT LAKES HOME HEALTH SERVICES,  d/b/a ELARA CARING  Plaintiff,  vs.  File No. 20-154-CB  BRANDI VANDEUSEN, CARELINE HEALTH  GROUP Michigan, CARELINE PALLIATIVE  CARELINE HOLDCO, LLC.  Defendant.
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15 16 17	CROSS-MOTIONS BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOYCE DRAGANCHUK, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE LANSING, MICHIGAN - WEDNESDAY, JULY 14, 2020
18	APPEARANCES:
19 20 21 22 23 24	For the Plaintiff:  Thomas Davis-P78626  280 N.Old Woodward Ave-Suite 400  Birmingham, Michigan 48009  248-645-0000
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33	For the Defendant:  Brendon R. Beer-P65365 405 South Jackson Street Jackson, Michigan 49201 517-787-8570
34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43	RECORDED BY:  Susan C. Melton, CER 7548 Certified Electronic Reporter (517) 483-6500 x6703

Appeals case nearly dead on point that says these referral

2 sources are not a protectable business interest. 3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 MR. BEER: And so, I'm not inclined to give a lot 5 of credence to that Florida case and I would suggest your 6 Honor should not either. 7 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. MR. BEER: Thank you. 8 9 THE COURT: Well, first, a little background. There are four counts in the complaint. Count one is 10 breach of contract. It's based on an employment agreement 11 12 and a confidentiality and Non-Compete Agreement. They are dated the same day. And under those agreements, there are 13 Non-solicitation and Non-Compete provision. Count two is 14 15 for tortious interference, which is brought against the Careline Health Group only. Count three is for unjust 16 17 enrichment and Count four is for civil conspiracy brought against all the defendants. 18 The bulk of these cross-motions deal with the 19 breach of contract claim and specifically the Non-20 21 solicitation and the Non-Compete provision. So, I'll start 22 there. First of all, plaintiff requests summary 23 disposition with regard to the Non-solicitation clause of 24 25 the contract. The Non-solicitation provision provides

"during the term of this agreement and following employees voluntary or involuntary termination from employment with Great Lakes, employee agrees that she shall not directly or indirectly either individually or on behalf of or in conjunction with another person, organization or company contact or solicit any Great Lakes client including but not limited to referral source patient, patient—advocate or family member or any other source of Great Lakes business or business referral for the purpose of soliciting the Great Lakes client to do business with anyone other than Great Lakes. For purposes of this subsection, Great Lakes client shall include a Great Lakes client at the time of the termination of employee." That's the end of the quote from the contract.

So, at least in the briefing, the plaintiff is

So, at least in the briefing, the plaintiff is exactly right in pointing out that the Non-solicitation clause is a prohibition on Ms. Van Deusen's conduct regardless of whether she's working for a competitor or not. And the analysis of whether Careline Health Group, which provides hospice care and Careline Physician Services, which does not, are competitors is just not applicable to the Non-solicitation clause based on the language of the contract, which is where we always start.

The plaintiff on this issue of Non-solicitation points to Ms. Van Deusen's own deposition where she

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acknowledges that she brought Careline Hospice personnel including the Careline Group CEO Joe Mead to meet with the referral sources so they could solicit hospital hospice referrals. And that in some cases, she brought the hospice representatives to meet with the same people that she had solicited for hospice in the past. She also said in her deposition that the hospice representatives who went to these meetings went to obtain business for Careline Hospice and that hospice referrals were sometimes generated at the meeting and that she, Ms. Van Deusen, facilitated these meetings in that she made sure the key decision makers were present and either explicitly or implicitly vouch for the hospice provider. The defendants point to other testimony and argue that Ms. Van Deusen did not sell any hospice care at the meetings and always deferred to the hospice representative if the referral source had any questions about hospice and that the, these meetings did not happen extremely frequently.

Here on this matter, the issue of whether, I'm sorry-, what, what here the issue that's been presented is I believe a disputed issue of fact. Whether Ms. Van Deusen was actually working in conjunction with the hospice representative to, to get a hospice referral is an issue that the jury has to decide. There is as I've indicated evidence brought forth on each side from the

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plaintiffs evidence and the plaintiff even puts it this way, that it's sort of like a 'wink, wink' situation when she goes to the referral source with the hospice representative. In order to make that inference, a finder of fact would have to make that inference and decide whether they were actually working in conjunction with each other., the language in the contract does prohibit working in conjunction with each other. And, and the defendant also their, their testimony that they point to is that they, the hospice representative again and Ms. Van Deusen remain separate and did not each participate in the -- , Ms. Van Deusen did not participate directly in the selling of hospice care. And for those reasons, I think that a jury has to decide that. So, there is a disputed issue of fact with respect to the Non-solicitation clause of the contract.

The plaintiff also request summary disposition with respect to the Non-Compete clause in the contract.

And the defendants request summary disposition in their favor because the defendants position is that the Non-Compete is just not enforceable because it's an unreasonable restraint on trade. Here the issue of whether Elara and Careline Physician Services are competitors is relevant because the Non-Compete provision provides

"during the term of this agreement and for two

years following employees voluntary or involuntary termination from employment with Great Lakes, Employee agrees that she shall not directly or indirectly in either individually or on behalf of or in conjunction with another person, organization or company engage in any self employment, employment with any other entity, work as a consultant or independent contractor of have full or partial ownership of any entity that provides or consults in providing home health care or hospice care within Great Lakes market area. Great Lakes market area shall be defined as those counties in which Great Lakes has received Medicare certification at the time of employee's voluntary or involuntary separation from Great Lakes."

Defendants maintain that Careline Physician

Services does not provide any hospice and it's not

licensed to provide hospice care. So, it doesn't fall

within the language of the contract and Ms. Van Deusen

isn't violating the contract by working solely for

Careline Physician Services. I think it is indisputable

that Careline Physician Services doesn't provide hospice

care. But, the plaintiff points to two reasons that Ms.

Van Deusen is in violation of the Non-Compete. First, the

contract says that she may not engage in the activity

either individual or in conjunction with another company

and second, the corporate structure is such that there is

no appreciable difference between working for Careline Physician Services and Careline Health Group. I'm gonna take a stab at describing what this, what I see is a factual dispute is about. It's a little complicated but, DEM Holding Group owned by Joseph Mead owns Careline Holdco. Careline Holdco has a subsidiary, I'm sorry-, Careline Holdco I wanted to go in a different direction, owns Careline Health Group. It's Careline Health Group that provides the hospice care and that I think is indisputably a competitor of the plaintiff.

But, Careline Holdco has a subsidiary CPC
Operating. Joseph Mead is the CEO of that subsidiary. They
provide management services to Careline Palliative Care.
And doing business as Careline Physician Services, Dr.
Kielhorn runs that operation. He's referred to as the
owner. He's treated as an employee and actually, Careline
Palliative Care pays management fees to CPC Operating for
their management services and CPC Operating pays the
employee Dr. Kielhorn out of those management fees as the
employee of CPC Operating. And it's that Careline
Physician Services, Dr. Kielhorn for which Ms. Van Deusen
works.

So, I hope that I got that right. But, I think that that illustrates the factual dispute here whether Ms.

Van Deusen worked in conjunction with another company or

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whether the corporate structure is such that there's no difference between the two, either one of those theories I think are both factual disputes for the jury.

So, in other words, the plaintiffs version that Ms. Van Deusen accompanied hospice providers from Careline Health Group when meeting with referral sources constitutes again that 'wink, wink' kind of arrangement. Versus the defendants version that Ms. Van Deusen and a hospice provider went there together. But, Ms. Van Deusen offered no information about hospice services and always deferred to the hospice provider are just competing versions of the facts. And I can't accept either one as true without fact finding and that's particularly true since just to accept plaintiffs version, an inference has to be made that there's some kind of a 'wink, wink' understanding. And, and second theory about the corporate structure, I think also takes a fact finder to resolve whether in fact there is no appreciable difference between the two providers and whether they acted as one.

I will say and maybe I shouldn't say this, but I don't think piercing the corporate veil is the correct framework for that. Piercing the corporate veil allows the corporate protection to fall away and liability to attach to an individual or I suppose, it could be another company. But, it's a method of attaching liability. It

has to be plead in some form and it's a path to liability. It does require a fraudulent or improper purpose. Here, I think, I just see it as a factual dispute about whether Ms. Van Deusen was de facto acting for Careline Health Group. But, if the plaintiff wants to prove something more difficult than that, then you know, go at it. But, there's a factual dispute either way. So, I would not grant summary disposition in that regard.

Now, the defendants say that the Non-Compete is overbroad and it's unenforceable because referral sources are not a protectable interest. They're not confidential and that Ms. Van Deusen is being prohibited from using her own general knowledge and skill. This does not involve a factual dispute because a jury doesn't decide this. It's a matter for the Court to decide and to assess whether or not the Non-Compete either standing by itself or narrowed complies with MCL 445.774(a)(1). And in this regard, both sides and I would add too, normally, the Court does it at the outset of the case when injunctive relief is being sought as to the Non-Compete. But, that wasn't done here and so, I'm doing it rather late in the game.

But, nevertheless, the Court has the ability to say it, it stands, it's enforceable, it falls, it is not or it is something in between and it can be modified and tailored to narrow it and make it enforceable. So, both

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sides agree there's no published authority in Michigan that addresses referral sources as legitimate protectable business interest. But, we do have a couple cases to work with and as far as Michigan cases go. They're at least helpful for either what they do show or what they don't show and how they are distinguished.

So, the first one is the Follmer case, F-O-L-L-And that's the Michigan Supreme Court case from 1984 that I think both sides have cited perhaps. And I want to talk about this case because I think it illustrates only that exploiting confidential information is not necessary in order to have an enforceable Non-But, it can be part of an enforceable Non-Compete. So, in Follmer, the employee had a contract that required the employee to pay his employer for the goodwill or the business in respect to a client or a customer if the employee rendered services to that client or customer within three years of termination of employment. And the Court held that the contract was not an unreasonable restraint of trade because it protected confidential information including information regarding customers.

And the matter was remanded for determination of whether the employee actually had access to confidential information that provided him with an unusual opportunity to as they put it 'obtain the patronage of particular

clients of his former employer.' So, the Supreme Court in that case used access to confidential information as a means to limit what would otherwise be a very broad restraint. Because the restraint didn't limit it to confidential information. But, that's how they limited it and they explained it rather well and this is in Footnote 15,

"a party who develops or possesses confidential information or trade secrets", which are not at issue here, "belonging to his employer should not be allowed to--, should not be allowed complete freedom to terminate his association and then use this very knowledge to undercut the employer who had taken him into his confidence. This conduct which amounts to a virtual stab in the back gives a competitor an unfair advantage and is inconsistent with our principles of fair play."

And of course, they're citing another federal case but that's what they say in footnote 15. But, I think we've learned too that access to confidential information is not the only way that a Non-Compete can be enforced.

And that takes me to the case that we've called either Bartlett, B-A-R-T-L-E-T-T, or Northern Michigan Title.

That's the unpublished Court of Appeals case from 2005.

This was a Non-Compete clause that prohibited the employee from engaging in the title insurance business in

Charlevoix County for a period of 5 years after termination. And that was unenforceable because it completely prohibited the employee from engaging in the title insurance business which amounted to just a restraint on the competition.

But, here's what the Court of Appeals had to say about the Non-Compete. Maybe I got something a little different out of this then the attorneys. But, this is what I read that they found as their criticism with this very broad, no work in the title insurance business for five years, this very broad Non-Compete. They say, first of all,

"the employee would not be permitted to obtain referrals from sources that never had a relationship with plaintiff. The employee would never be able to offer title insurance services to clients who never had or never would have given business to plaintiff in the first place.

There are seldom repeat clients in the title insurance business and business is developed through referral sources of which there are many and which are readily identified in the community."

So, while the Follmer Court used confidential information as their way of validating Non-Compete, the, the Bartlett case or the Northern Michigan Title case didn't use confidential information, they looked at these

other factors. And as a matter fact, they said that the confidential information is a claim that stands alone. So, they didn't even take that into account the way the Follmer Court did.

But, in any event, I think those, those factors that the Northern Michigan Title case pointed to are valuable. And so, from those cases, Follmer and the Northern Michigan Title case, I take the following referral sources need not be confidential in order to enforce the Non-Compete. And I think In this case, they aren't. I'll talk about that maybe in a minute. But, there is other confidential information that go along with the referral sources in this case that I think is at issue here.

Unlike Bartlett, the Non-Compete or unlike

Northern Michigan Title, the Non-Compete here is limited

to hospice care and to hospice care in the Great Lakes

market area, which is the counties in which Great Lakes

have received Medicare certification at the time of Ms.

Van Deusen's separation. So, it's distinguishable from one

of the factors in Barlett for that reason.

Also, and this is an important one, there may not be repeat clients in hospice care. But, there most certainly are repeat referrals sources. And this was described in the deposition testimony. It was described in

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deposition testimony as facilities having not only preferred providers, providers that they would go to again and again and again. But, in some cases, even exclusive providers. So, one single provider that that facility would always go to as a referral for their patient as a provider for their patient. So, developing a referral source in this case has potentially long-lasting rewards and the plaintiff does in fact compete to achieve that.

Now, there was a lot of argument in the briefing about whether referral sources are confidential or not. I, I reviewed all of the deposition testimony that both sides pointed to and even the testimony that the plaintiff pointed to and I just don't think it supports that just a referral source by itself is confidential. It was explained by various different witnesses as you walk in the door of a facility and you ask to talk to someone that would be relevant to what you are there for and they give you someone and maybe then you work through it a little bit from there and get to higher levels of management. So, yes, can you open up a phonebook and see for a facility who it is you need to talk to? No. But, is it a secret? No. You just go to the facility and you start asking questions and that's how it was described. But, it was also described in the testimony that developing a referral source and getting that coveted spot of a preferred

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provider or even an exclusive provider, it has, it involves much, much more than just walking in the door and trying to drill down on who it is you need to talk to.

And one of the ways that it's done is well, developing the relationship and working that source and doing it repeatedly. And, and I get, I think even if we got to that point, it could be argued that that's Ms. Van Deusen's talent and her skill no doubt as an excellent salesperson. But, there's even more to it than that because there was an exchange of company information where Ms. Van Deusen obtained information from other account executives even about the referral sources, what works, what doesn't and what strategies can be undertaken to improve business? So, that's much different than the Northern, the Northern Michigan Title case. And having acquired the information and having built relationships with referral sources that grow into preferred provider or even exclusive provider status using the resources that were available through the plaintiff makes the Non-Compete in the area of hospice care for the counties where Great Lakes has Medicare certification, a reasonable restraint on trade and a protectable business interest.

Again, like going back to Follmer and Footnote

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the employer who had taken the employee into, into their

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confidence, that amounts to a virtual stab in the back and gives the competitor an unfair advantage and is inconsistent with our principles of fair play.

So, I do not find the Non-Compete for that reason to be unenforceable. Now, there are maybe some, there is some fine tuning that could be done on it and I may agree with some of the things that the defendants point out. They say that the line of business restriction is unreasonable. The contract prohibits employment for any entity that provides home health care or hospice care. And defendant argues that it should be narrowed to hospice care only. I agree. Even though the plaintiff says that Ms. Van Deusen sold home health care, hospice and palliative care. The deposition testimony doesn't really support that. The plaintiff directs me to Ms. Van Deusen's deposition at page 35. But, she says she never sold home health care. She says and I'm not sure I know what this means, but she says she "gathered the information and sent it in." And then she says but she never sold home health care services. And so, for that reason, I think it does have to be narrowed and also, palliative care wasn't even sold by the plaintiff at the time of Ms. Van Deusen's separation. So, I think it has to be further narrowed as I agree again with the defendant that it should be narrowed to hospice care only.

And finally, the defendants say that the duration is unreasonable. The duration of two years is not unreasonable. There's many reported decisions holding that two years on a Non-Compete is not unreasonable. I, I won't just rely on that though. I think it probably has to be judged against the facts of the particular case. And here, given the testimony about the development of relationships with referral sources and the evolving into a preferred or an exclusive provider, two years is not unreasonable.

And then, the tortious interference, a jury could find that Ms. Van Deusen breached the contract. Therefore, the defendants aren't entitled to summary disposition on the tortious interference. And I, but I cannot find, I also cannot find as a matter of law, that Careline made an unjustified instigation of a breach of contract because the jury has to decide if there was a breach. And even if there was, whether Careline unjustifiably instigated it.

As to the civil conspiracy, the defendant says

Ms. Van Deusen can't conspire to breach her own contract.

The plaintiff says that the claim is against the three

Careline entities. If memory serves me correctly, it

actually is against all defendants. But, I'll take what

the plaintiff says as a cure on that issue about breaching

your own--, or conspiring to breach your own contract.

With respect to unjust enrichment, an implied contract 1 claim can only made where there's no expressed contract. 2 3 There is an expressed contract here. There is no basis 4 for an unjust enrichment claim. And then, the contractual 5 attorney fees is just simply premature given that the 6 breach of contract claim has to be decided by a jury. 7 So, I'm denying the plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Disposition. I'm denying the defendants 8 9 Motion for Summary Disposition except with respect to the things that I've mentioned. I guess that would be the, 10 there's no unjust enrichment claim and I am narrowing the 11 12 scope of the Non-Compete to comply with the law. And I will need someone to volunteer to submit an order that 13 reflects 'for the reasons stated on the record'. 14 15 MR. BEER: I will volunteer, your Honor. I was taking extensive notes. 16 17 THE COURT: Great. Thank you. And in case you forget, I livestreamed it on my Youtube channel and I 18 19 leave those recordings up so you can review. MR. DAVIS: Thank you, your Honor. 20 21 THE COURT: Thank you. And that will conclude 22 this hearing. MR. BEER: Thank you, your Honor. 23 24 (Hearing concludes at 3:20 PM) 25

1	STATE OF MICHIGAN)
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10	I certify that that this transcript, consisting of 59
11	pages, is a complete, true, and correct transcript of the
12	proceedings and testimony taken in this case on Wednesday,
13	July 14, 2021.
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16 17 18 19 20 21 22	August 6, 2021  Susan C. Melton-CER 7548 30 <sup>th</sup> Circuit Court 313 West Kalamazoo Avenue Lansing, Michigan 48901 517-483-6500 ext.6703